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Abstract. Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) systems are getting
pervasively deployed in many daily life applications. But this increased
usage of RFID systems brings some serious problems together, security
and privacy. In some applications, ownership transfer of RFID labels is
sine qua non need. Specifically, the owner of RFID tag might be required
to change several times during its lifetime. Besides, after ownership trans-
fer, the authentication protocol should also prevent the old owner to trace
the tags and disallow the new owner to trace old transactions of the tags.
On the other hand, while achieving privacy and security concerns, the
computation complexity should be considered. In order to resolve these
issues, numerous authentication protocols have been proposed in the lit-
erature. Many of them failed and their computation load on the server
side is very high. Motivated by this need, we propose an RFID mutual
authentication protocol to provide ownership transfer. In our protocol,
the server needs only a constant-time complexity for identification when
the tag and server are synchronized. In case of ownership transfer, our
protocol preserves both old and new owners’ privacy. Our protocol is
backward untraceable against a strong adversary who compromise tag,
and also forward untraceable under an assumption.
Keywords: RFID, Privacy, Security, Ownership Transfer Protocol.
1 Introduction
Today, ubiquitous information and communication technology has been widely
accepted by everyone that aspire to reach information anytime and anywhere.
Radio-frequency identification (RFID) systems are one of the ubiquitous com-
puting in which technology provides practical services to people in their daily
life. RFID technology aims to identify and track an item or a person by using
radio waves. It has been pervasively deployed in several daily life applications
such as contact-less credit cards, e-passports, ticketing systems, etc.
A RFID system basically consists of several tags (transponders), a set of read-
ers (interrogator) and a back-end receiver. A tag contains a microchip which
carries data and antenna. It is interrogated by a reader via its modulated radio
signals. A RFID reader that is the central part of an RFID system, acquires
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the data of the tag and conveys it to the back-end system for further processing.
Moreover, RFID tags can be categorized into three groups by using energy source
such as active, passive and semi-passive or battery assisted tags. Passive RFID
tags do not have internal energy sources. Instead, they use the radio energy
transmitted by the reader [10]. Furthermore, RFID systems can also be grouped
into three basic ranges by their using operating frequency: Low frequency (LF,
30-300 KHz), high frequency (HF 3-30 MHz) and ultra high frequency ( 300
MHz - 3 GHz ) / microwave ( >3 GHz) [9].
Nowadays, the number of RFID applications have been proliferating because
of their productivity, efficiency, reliability and so on. Many companies also prefer
low-cost tags with tiny sizes. This brings some computational and memory re-
strictions to RFID tags. On the other hand, RFID tags and readers communicate
with each other over an air interface. This insecure channel and the limited ca-
pabilities of RFID tags cause security and privacy vulnerabilities. An adversary
can do tag impersonating, tracking, eavesdropping, and denial of service (DoS)
attack. Besides the vulnerabilities, a tag might be distinguishable in its life-span
by an attacker. If it is once recognized by an adversary, it can be easily traceable.
At that situation, there might be two attacks. (i) An attacker might track the
previous interactions of the tag or (ii) he may track the future ones. These two
attacks are called backward traceability and forward traceability, respectively.
The protocol used for RFID system should provide not only resistance against
passive attacks, replay attacks, cloning attacks but also resistance against active
attacks. There are public-key cryptography solutions in the literature but none
of them are convenient for the low-cost tags used in lots of applications because
of their limitations. It needs to find much light-weight approaches. Therefore,
many light-weight authentication protocols are proposed to defeat adversaries
that deceive the capacity-restricted tags. But, designing light-weight crypto-
graphic authentication protocols with basic cryptographic primitives (xor, hash
function) is a challenging task [18].
Another significant problem is the changing ownership of an RFID tag several
times during its life-cycle. For instance, tags are initially created and attached
to objects by producers, then labeled objects are taken over to retailers, and
finally consumers buy tagged objects from shopping malls [13]. The ownership
of a labeled object may be frequently transferred from one party to another. At
the moment of the transfer, both new and old owners have the same information
about the tag. This might cause privacy problems. This transfer should guarantee
that the old owner should no longer be able to trace the future interactions and
the new owner should not be able to trace old interactions. Besides having secure
authentication protocols by providing privacy, the performance of the entire
system becomes an important issue. Therefore, designing authentication protocol
without compromising security and privacy begets decreases the efficiency of
the whole system. However, achieving both security and privacy properties, the
computational complexity of the tag and the server side can vary dramatically
from one protocol to another. Hence, while handling security and privacy issues,
it is also important to realize it with less computational complexity.
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In order to resolve these security and privacy issues, numerous RFID authen-
tication protocols have been recently proposed [1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14–17]. How-
ever, some of them are not compliant to ownership transfer. Also, none of them
achieves constant-time complexity for identification while providing forward un-
traceability against old-owner and backward untraceability (forward secrecy)
against the new owner.
Our Contributions. We propose an efficient, secure and private RFID mu-
tual authentication protocol which needs constant-time complexity to identify a
tag. Then, we utilize this protocol and achieve a secure and efficient ownership
transfer. We prove that our protocol achieves forward secrecy against the new
owner and forward untraceability against the old owner. Moreover, we also show
that our protocol provides forward secrecy against a strong attack and forward
untraceability under an assumption that the adversary misses one subsequent
successful protocol between the reader and the compromised tag.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, security and threat model,
security and privacy concerns are discussed in RFID systems for ubiquitous
networks. Section 3 describes our proposed protocol. In Section 4, analysis of
our protocol is given in detail. In Section 5, we conclude the paper.
2 Adversarial Model
In this section we describe our adversarial model used in analyzing the proposed
protocol, then define the privacy notions which are also used to be proved. Since
the tags and the reader communicates over an insecure wireless channel, we
consider Byzantine adversarial model [6].
– Each tag memory is not tamper resistant and vulnerable to physical attacks.
– Each tag/reader performs cryptographic hash operations.
– The reader and tags communicate over an insecure wireless channel and so
an active attacker can intercept, modify and generate messages.
– The messages between server and readers are transmitted securely.
– The reader and the server are assumed to be trusted parties. They cannot
be compromised.
Since the tags are not tamper resistant, we assume that a strong adversary
can corrupt a tag and access to its persistent memory. In this case, the adversary
should not be able link any current and past communication of the victim tags.
This privacy notion is called backward untraceability. We define it more formally
as follows.
Definition 1. Backward Untraceability: An RFID scheme provides backward
untraceability if A compromising Ti at time t cannot trace the past interactions
of Ti that occurred at time t′ < t.
On the other hand, the strong adversary should not be able to trace the future
interactions of the victim tag. This privacy notion, called forward untraceability,
is described as follows.
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Definition 2. Forward Untraceability: An RFID scheme provides forward un-
traceability if A compromising Ti at time t cannot trace the future interactions
of Ti that occurred at time t′ > t.
3 The Proposed Protocol
In this section, we propose a novel scalable RFID authentication protocol which
is the enhanced version of the scheme presented in [12]. In our protocol, we
achieve the constant-time complexity for the authentication of synchronized tags
whereas the complexity in [12] is O(N) where N is the number of tag in the
system.
The notations used in the protocol are defined. Then, the initialization and
the authentication phases are described in detail. The protocol is summarized
in Figure 1.
3.1 The Notations
– ∈R: The random choice operator that randomly selects an element from a
finite set.
– ⊕, || : XOR operator and concatenation operator, respectively.
– h, H : A hash function s.t. h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}2n.
Both of them are one-way and collision resistant functions.
– N : The number of tags in the database.
– Na, Nb : n-bit nonce generated by the reader and the tag, respectively.
– K : n-bit secret shared between the tag and the reader.
– val1, val2 : n-bit the server validator of the tag and the reader, respectively.
– Kold1 , Kold2 : Previous n-bit secret shared between the tag and the reader.
– valold1 , val
old
2 : Previous n-bit the server validator of the tag and the reader,
respectively.
– L, S : The seed value of val1 and val2, respectively.
– r1, r2 : n-bit random bit strings produced by h(Na), h(Nb,K), respectively.
– vi : n-bit random bit strings produced by h(K, r1, r2).
– M1,M2 : M1 = v1 ⊕ L, M2 = v2 ⊕ S.
– DB : Server database.
– γ : n-bit string.
– state : 1-bit string is 0 or 1.
3.2 The Registration Phase
For each tag Ti, the following steps have to be performed by the registrar (e.g.
the tag manufacturer) before the authentication protocol:
1. The registrar generates three n-bit random nonce (K, S, L). It also computes
val1 = h(L,K), val2 = h(S). Initially, K
old1 and Kold2 are both equal to K,
Sold is equal to S, and valold1 is equal to val1. Finally, state is set to 0 and
it computes hash of the shared secret key K, γ = h(K).
134 S. Kardas¸ et al.
2. The registrar creates an entry in its back-end database and stores (K,S,
val1, K
old1 , Kold2 , Sold, valold1 ,h(K)) in the entry.
3. The registrar assigns (K,L, val2, state) to the tag Ti.
3.3 The Authentication Phase
In our protocol (see Figure 1) each tag stores its own triple values K, L, val2,
γ,and state . The reader stores the K, S, val1 for that tag. The steps are de-
scribed below.
Step 1. A reader randomly generates an n-bit nonce Na and computes hash of
it r1 = h(Na). Then it sends r1 to the tag Ti.
Step 2. The tag Ti randomly generates a n-bit Nb nonce and computes hash of
it, r2 = h(Nb,K). Then, it checks the state. If its own state is 0, it computes
hash of the shared secret key K. If it is not, the tag randomly generates a
n-bit γ nonce. Later, the tag uses a pseudo-random function that digests r1,
r2 messages with shared secret key K to compute v1||v2 = H(K, r1, r2). The
length of each v1 and v2 are both equal to n. After that, the tag computes
message M1 by simply XORing v1 with secret L. Finally, the tag sends r2,
M1 and γ messages to the reader.
Step 3. The reader transfers Na, r1, r2, M1, and γ to the server.
Step 4. The server firstly searches in DB that there exists h(K) equals to γ.
The server performs an exhaustive search among all tags in the database.
It computes v1||v2 = H(K, r1, r2) and h(M1 ⊕ v1,K). The server checks
whether h(M1 ⊕ v1,Kold1) is equals to val1. If one match is found, then the
server computes M2 message by XORing v2 with S and then sends M2 to
the reader. After that, it updates Kold2 = Kold1 , Kold1 = K, Sold = S,
valold1 = val1, K = v2, S = Na, and val1 = r2. If no match is found,
then the server performs another an exhaustive search among all tags in the
database. In this time, it computes v1||v2 = H(Kold1 , r1, r2) and it checks
whether h(M1 ⊕ v1,Kold2) is equals to valold1 . If one match is found, the
server computes M2 message by XORing v2 with S and sends M2 to the tag.
After that, it updates K = v2, S = Na, and val1 = r1. However, if there is
no match, the server generates an n-bit random bit string and sends it to the
reader. The reason behind sending random bit string is that this prevents
any attacker to validate M1 for random nonce r1 and r2.
Step 5. The reader forwards M2 to the tag Ti. Upon receiving M2 message, Ti
computes h(M2 ⊕ v2) and checks whether it is equal to val2. If equal, then
it updates K = v2, L = Nb, and val2 = r1.
3.4 The Ownership Transfer
When the owner of the tags are required to change one party to another, the tags
are first synchronized with the server. The server runs at least two successful
authentication protocols with tags in a secure environment where no adversary
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is allowed to perform any passive/active attacks. Then, all the tags and their
related information are transferred to new owner. Once the new owner receives
the information and tags, he/she runs at least one successful protocol between
readers and the tags in a secure environment where a malicious adversary is not
allowed.
During the ownership transfer, the old owner does not need to transfer the se-
cret values of Kold2 and Sold of the tags to the new owner because the remaining
secrets are enough to communicate with the synchronized tags.
Server






Na ∈R {0, 1}n
r1 = h(Na) r1 





γ ∈R {0, 1}n
v1||v2 = H(K, r1, r2)
|v1| = |v2| = n
M1 = v1 ⊕ L
state = 1r2,M1, γffr1, r2, Na,M1, γff





if ∃ γ = h(K) in DB
if h(M1 ⊕ v1,Kold1) = val1
s.t. v1||v2 = H(K, r1, r2)
M2 = v2 ⊕ S,Kold2 = Kold1
Kold1 = K,Sold = S,
valold1 = val1,




For each record in DB
if h(M1 ⊕ v1,Kold2) = val1
s.t. v1||v2 = H(Kold1 , r1, r2)
M2 = v2 ⊕ S,Kold2 = Kold1
Kold1 = K,Sold = S,
valold1 = val1,
K = v1, S = Na,
val1 = r2.
else
M2 ∈R {0, 1}n
}
Fig. 1. The Proposed RFID Authentication Protocol
4 Security, Privacy, and Performance Analysis
In this section, we first describe the adversarial capabilities. Then, we analyze
our ownership transfer protocol depicted in Figure 1 against passive and strong
attacks.
In our model, we assume that each tag can perform cryptographic hash op-
erations. The communication between server and readers are assumed to be
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secure because they have no restriction on using SSL/TLS protocol. However,
the reader and tags communicate over an insecure wireless channel and so an
attacker can intercept, modify and generate messages. Also, each tag memory is
not tamper-proof.
4.1 The Security against Timing Attacks
The proposed protocol is vulnerable to timing attacks [3]. An adversary can
distinguish synchronized tags and un-synchronized tags by simply considering
the response time of the server because the identification time for the latter
tags requires much more than the former tags. This kind of attacks can be
avoided by using distributed computation servers. Let us illustrate the solution.
Assume that we have 220 tags in the database and the server does only 223 hash
computation per second. Then, the time to identify an un-synchronized tag is
220/223 = 0.125s but for the synchronized tag is almost zero. For the solution, we
can use multiple distributed server (say 16), then the identification time can be
reduced to 0.125/16 = 7, 8125ms and when a synchronized tag is to be identified
the server waits up to 7, 8125ms.
4.2 The Security against Passive Adversary
An offline passive adversary may want to know the contents of the secrets K
and L stored in the tag Ti. Then, the adversary simply eavesdrops the channels
between a legitimate reader and Ti in order to get r1, r2, M1, M2 and γ. With
these information and publish hash function H , she cannot obtain the secret K
or L because of one-wayness of the hash function.
Moreover, the protocol also resists against replay attack because a challenge-
response scheme is used in the protocol. In addition, for each session of the
protocol a new pair of random numbers (r1, r2) are used. This prevents to use
the same challenge-response values in other sessions.
Furthermore, our protocol is resistant against desynchronization even if’ last
flow of the protocol drops. Normally, this causes desynchronization of the tag
secrets and the back-end server. However, this issue is resolved by storing pre-
vious tag secrets in the database. Hence the server can resynchronize with the
tags in such a condition.
4.3 The Security against Strong Adversary
In this section, we will analyze the protocol depicted at Figure 1 in terms of
backward and forward untraceability [2, 15, 19] against old owner, new owner,
and a strong malicious adversary who can compromise a tag. As a starting point,
we assume that at time ti, the owner of the system is changed. We test backward
untraceability for the new owner, denoted by An, with assumption that An has
had control over communications between reader and tags made before time
ti. Note that, the number of these communications is finite. Similarly, we test
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forward untraceability against the old owner, denoted by Ao. Also, we test these
two privacy properties against a strong adversary As with assumption that As
has ability of corrupting a tag and captures its secrets. Throughout the analysis,
in order to make proofs more understandable, without loss of generality, we
assume that there are only two tags in the system, namely T0 and T1. First of
all, let us give the definitions of concepts mentioned above and the oracle that
we use in the proofs of theorem given below.
Definition 3. Oracle Ok: The oracle chooses b ∈R {0, 1}. If b = 0, Ok sends to
the adversary the protocol transcript which was realized between tag T0 and the
reader at time tk. Similarly, if b = 1, the protocol transcript which was realized
between tag T1 and the reader at time tk is sent to the adversary by the oracle.
At the end, the adversary sends the bit b′ by after investigating the transcript
sent. If Pr[(b′ = b) = 1] = 12 + , where  is non-negligible, than the adversary
wins.
One can give simplified version of the oracle defined above as follows: At time
ti, A gets information of server and the tag T0. Then at time tk, Ok chooses
b ∈R {0, 1}. The transcript sent to the adversary according to value of b same
as above. Then, A returns b′ = 0 if he thinks the transcript sent by oracle
realized between reader and tag T0. Otherwise the adversary returns b′ = 1. If
Pr[(b′ = b) = 1] = 12 + , where  is non-negligible, than the adversary wins.
Throughout the proofs given to the corresponding theorem, four subsequent
successful protocol transactions are enough. Thus, without loss of generality,
we assume that i = 4 is the time where server owner changed, i.e. at time t4.
Moreover, addition to the notations given at protocol steps, we use left subscript
part to denote the time that it was used.
In order to obtain traceability capability of An, we start studying with more
powerful adversary Ac, who has had all secrets of the server and tags at time ti
and observed all protocol transactions realized before given time.
Theorem 1. The system has backward untraceability property for time tk sat-
isfying k < i− 3 for the adversary Ac
Proof. Since at time t4, Ac knows the value of 4val1 and this value equals to
3r2, then at time t3, Ac can traces T0. Moreover, as Ac knows the value of
4S
old1 , then she knows the value of 3S. Thus, 2Na value is known. Therefore,
at time t2, Ac can trace T0 as he can figure out the value of 2r1 from h(2Na).
Note that, after that point, Ac knows 2r2 and 2M2 and since 2K = 4Kold2, the
values of 2v1 and 2v2 are known. Hence, 2S is known. So, Ac learns the value
of 1Na. From this knowledge, Ac calculates 1r1. Therefore, Ac can trace T0 at
time t1, which means Ac also learns the values of 1r2, 1M1, 1M2. Apart from
these values, 1L is also known. Note that, the only thing Ac knows about the
transaction happened at time t0 is 0Nb. Thus, the probability of Ac’s finding the
correct value of 0r2 is
1
2n since 0K is not known and the range of hash function
h is {0, 1}n. Similarly, finding correct values of 0r1,0M1,0M2 is 12n . Thus, the
probability that Ac distinguishes the transcript that the oracle sent is 12 + 12n .
However, 12n is negligible.
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Therefore, if Ac has all secrets of the server and tags at time ti, then the
system has backward untraceability property for time tk satisfying k < i− 3.
Remark 1. The values of Kold2 and Sold of tags are stored in server database in
order to overcome synchronization problem. If the system is synchronized when
ownership transfer is realized, then Kold2 and Sold values are not given to An.
At the next part, we give a backward traceability result for an adversary AcR,
which is like Ac with exception indicated at Remark 1.
Corollary 1. The system has backward untraceability property for time tk sat-
isfying k < i− 2 for the adversary AcR.
Remark 2. The privacy is the main aim that should be reached. Therefore, just
before ownership transfer, Ao completes two successful protocol transactions
with tags such that no part of the protocol transcripts are seen by An.
Note that the adversary Ac with incapability explained at Remark 2 corre-
sponds to the new owner, An. Thus, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2. For the new owner, An, the system has backward untraceability
property for time tk satisfying k < i.
Theorem 2. If Ao has all secrets of the server and tags at time ti, then the
system has forward untraceability property for time tk satisfying k > i.
Proof. Since ownership transfer occurs, Ao misses at least one of the subsequent
successful protocol transactions between An and tags. We can get the best result
if one subsequent successful transaction miss is assumed. In that case, Ao only




old. Since the attacker missed
a subsequent successful transaction, the other values are unknown. Note that,
Ao can find the value of 4r2 with possibility of 12n since the value of 4Nb is not
known. By similar arguments, Ao guesses the value 4r2 with possibility of 12n .
Although Ao knows the values of 4S and 4L, as 4v1 and 4v2 are not known,
Ao can figure out the values of 4M1 and 4M2 with possibility of 12n . Hence, the







Therefore, if A0 has all secrets of the server and tags at time ti, then the
system has forward untraceability property for time tk satisfying k > i.
Our next result is about the adversary,As, who can corrupt a tag and capture
all secrets of the tag at any given time and follow all steps of the each successful
protocol runs before and after the time that corruption occurs.
Corollary 3. If As corrupts a tag at time tj with j = i, then the system has
backward untraceability for time tk satisfying k < j − 1 and forward untraceabil-
ity for time tk satisfying k > j + 1 under the assumption that As misses the
transactions occurred at time j + 1 and j − 1.
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Proof. Forward secrecy part is direct result of Theorem 2. Moreover, the back-
ward secrecy result is derived from Remark 3
Remark 3. If As does not miss the transaction at j−1, then by the knowledge of
jval2, he deduces the value of j−1r1. Thus, the values of j−1r2, j−1M1, j−1M2 are
known to him. Thus, in this case, As can trace the corrupted tag at time tj−1.
However, no more traces are possible, because As knows only the value of j−2Nb
about the transaction realized at time tj−2 and from the similar arguments given
at proof of Theorem 1, the success probability that As traces the corrupted tag





Remark 4. If As does not miss any transaction after corruption occurs, then As
can trace the corrupted tag forever.
Theorem 3. The proposed protocol satisfies tag authentication under the as-
sumption specified in Corollary 3.
Proof. First of all, let us assume that the adversary has no corrupt tag capa-
bility. In this case, the adversary has to learn the value of either K or Kold1 to
impersonate the tag. To learn the values of these variables, the adversary has to
learn the value of v1 of previous protocol transcript. However, to learn the value
of v1, the adversary has to figure out the value of K of previous runs or the value
of L. However, the value of L is the chosen random Nb value of previous run.
Thus, the adversary can only guess the value of L. Therefore, the values v1, K
and Kold1 are dependent each other. Thus, the only remained way for the ad-
versary to impersonate the tag is to guess the value of v1, K or K
old1 correctly.
Since the space of these variables are large enough, the success probability of
the adversary is negligible.
Moreover, since the tag authentication is investigated under the assumption
Corollary 3, the system satisfies tag authentication for the case where the ad-
versary can corrupt the tag.
4.4 Performance Issues
Considering memory storage for tag identifiers or keys and other information,
our protocol requires 3n+ 1 bit (3n-bit for K, L, and val2 and 1-bit for state)
memory in tag side. Contrary to tags, server has no limited resource so we do
not consider the server-side memory usage.
Concerning computational cost, our protocol requires at most 4 hash com-
putation overhead for the tag. If the tags and the server are synchronized, the
computational complexity at the server side is O(1). Otherwise, the complexity
is at most O(N).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we first proposed a secure and efficient an RFID mutual authen-
tication protocol which is the revised version of the scheme presented in [12].
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With the use of the authentication protocol, we achieve ownership transfer. We
prove that our protocol provides forward untraceability against the old owner of
the tags and backward untraceability against the new owner of the tags. Also,
we show that our authentication protocol provides backward untraceability of a
tag against an adversary who compromises the tag and forward untraceability
under the assumption that the adversary misses at least one of the subsequent
authentication protocol between the tag and the reader. Our protocol requires
O(1) complexity to identify a synchronized tag.
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